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Julian Symons* Orwell's Prophecies: The
Limits of Liberty and the
Limits of Law
Let me say something first about the scope of this talk. As we
approach 1984, George Orwell's book with that title seems to have
increasing relevancy. It was not intended as a prophetic work - the
very title came simply from the fact that the final version was
completed in 1948, so that the last two numerals were reversed.
And it was concerned less with conjectural futures than with the
world Orwell saw around him. It was, he said, a projection of what
might happen if totalitarian tendencies in several countries
developed as they had been doing in the years since 1939. So one
aspect of the work was concerned with the social politics of the
time, especially those of the Soviet Union and its allies. But he was
interested also in the problems of freedom and liberty considered as
ideas, and it is over this aspect of his work that I shall start. What is
the nature of freedom, what are our attitudes towards it, at the end
of 1983? Do people ask for wrong kinds of freedoms at times? Is it
possible that freedom in some contexts works against social good?
In the course of asking such questions, and discussing modern
examples of freedom demanded by minority groups, I shall be
referring back often to Orwell, for the absolute directness of his
opinions and his refusal to take any orthodox view for granted
constitute a large part of his value for our time as well as his own. If
freedom of the press means anything important, he once said, it
must mean freedom for people to say things we do not wish to hear.
That is a phrase to which I shall return. Some of you may even find
it exemplified in this lecture.
But it may be asked: how can there possibly be any argument
about freedom? Where is the problem? Freedom? Naturally we're
all in favour of it, never a dissentient voice in the house. Yet there is
a problem, and it is essentially how to reconcile the demands made
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and a social and military historian. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, he
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by society upon the individuals in it, with the desire of those
individuals for an ever-increasing amount of personal freedom in
ordering their own lives. Should individuals and groups be free to
drop out of society, as many young people in the West have done?
And if they exercise such freedom, should society deny them the
right to use all those services, the social benefits ranging from cash
through the sewerage system to medical help, that are paid for by
the majority who have not dropped out? That is one instance of the
problems involved by the idea of freedom. Or rather by the practice
of it, for the idea is one thing, the practice another.
As an example of the gap between theory and practice, consider
the case of John Stuart Mill. Mill's essay On Liberty outlines an
attitude towards freedom which seemed irrefutable to many liberal
thinkers in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and still finds
many supporters, whose pattern of thought follows Mill, even
though at second or third hand. Mill was writing in mid-century, at
a time when individual freedom was very firmly bound by social
constraints. No lady could possibly take a paid job, unless she was
in what were called distressed circumstances, and freedom of action
for men was strictly ordered by their position in society. At the core
of Mill's brilliant little essay is the view that it was wrong for
heretical minorities of all kinds to be denied the liberties available to
those who took a majority view. The only end for which society is
warranted in infringing the liberty of action of any individual, he
said, is self-protection. Power should be exercised to prevent the
individual from doing harm to others, but that is the only part of his
conduct for which he should be answerable to society. In every
other way he should have freedom. Freedom of thought and feeling;
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical and
speculative; freedom to publish and express any opinion; freedom of
tastes and pursuits; freedom also for a number of people to combine
for any purpose not involving harm to others. "No society", Mill
says, "in which these liberties are not, on the whole respected is
free, whatever may be its form of government, and none is
completely free in which they do not exist absolute and
unqualified."
The basis of Mill's viewpoint is that we can never be quite sure
about the truth or falsity of any opinion, so that suppression is an
assertion of infallibility that can't be justified. This is something he
pursues at great length. Even if an opinion is false, he says, it
should not be suppressed, because it is by the continual conflict of
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opinion that we arrive at truth. If what we conceive to be truth must
not be controverted, and as he says "fully, frequently and fearlessly
discussed", it will turn from living truth to dead dogma.
That is a brief, and, I hope, fair summary of the doctrine
advanced in Mill's essay, in his characteristically lucid and
persuasive style. If what he says is regarded as an abstract statement
of something desirable, not many people would disagree with it, but
if we should go on to suggest action on such views Mill shows,
almost casually and off-handedly, that he has no intention of
applying the abstract phrases to the actual events of his own time.
He says:
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment
when delivered orally to an excited mob, assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer.
In other words, an opinion may be tolerated when it is purely
verbal; but if it is likely to lead to results in the field of action, it
should be suppressed. And Mill was able also neatly to exclude
from his conception of freedom and liberty Britain's vast
nineteenth-century colonial empire:
We may leave out of consideration those backward states of
society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage
... . Despotism is a legitimate method of government in dealing
with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement.
But can we be sure that the despots will have in mind the
improvement of the barbarians, rather than their continued
subjection? There's the rub. That is a possibility Mill, a man of high
principle who assumed others to be equally virtuous, doesn't even
consider. And since thought and speech have their ends in action, is
it not hypocritical to suggest that criticism of private property or of
corn-dealers or anything else should be permitted - providing such
criticism is made in circumstances when it can't possibly be
effective?
Mill was deeply conscious of the conflict between society and the
individual, yet one must say that he evaded it. To find the true
meaning of his fine words we must compare what he asks for
verbally with what he requires in practice. He demands verbally an
unlimited amount of "freedom", setting no bound at all to it, and
saying that no opinion should be suppressed even though it may be
that of one man against the rest of the world. In practice, however,
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he asks only that freedom should prevail in the section of society to
which he belongs. The liberal intellectuals of Mill's day did not
wish to change the nature of government, and therefore did not
propose to grant practical freedom to those who wished to
overthrow it. They had no intention of relinquishing British
colonies, and therefore thought despotism to be "legitimate" in
dealing with "barbarians". Of course no conscious hypocrisy is
implied in Mill or his fellow-thinkers. The point I am making is that
if you say, as so many liberals did in Victorian times and do to-day,
"Freedom is a good thing, lack of it is a bad thing", without any
qualification, then you cannot choose your freedoms. "Freedom"
for Mill's barbarians would have implied the death of the despots
who ruled them, as "freedom" for the Catholics in Northern Ireland
now implies the death of British soldiers and civilians who are the
present rulers of the province. Freedom, failing some further
definition of it, is only a word.
It was such condemnation of freedom as an abstract idea, often
used as a cover for something unpleasant, that Orwell had in mind
in 1984. On the white concrete pyramid of the Ministry of Truth,
picked out in elegant lettering, are the three Party slogans: "War is
Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength." And of the
chief Ministries in Oceania, the Ministry of Peace concerns itself
with war; the Ministry of Love with law and order; and the Ministry
of Plenty with economic affairs. In case we should think these are
merely easy paradoxes Orwell bodies out the full meaning of the
phrases in the extracts from Goldstein's book that Winston Smith is
permitted to read. The book says:
"The essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human
lives, but of the products of human labour. War is a way of
shattering to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking
in the depths of the sea, materials which might otherwise be used
to make the masses too comfortable."
And:
"Much the same effect would be obtained if the three
super-states, instead of fighting one another, should agree to live
in perpetual peace, each inviolate within its own boundaries."
A peace that was truly permanent would be the same as a permanent
war. This is the inner meaning of the Party slogan: "War Is Peace."
And although we don't get Goldstein's explanation of "Freedom Is
Slavery", the essentials of it are given by O'Brien, the Party
interrogator who first tricks and then tortures Winston. O'Brien, a
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Berkeleyan solipsist, forces Winston to accept that two and two may
make four or five, and that the individual's freedom exists only
when he makes submission to a superior power. "We are the priests
of power", he says to Winston. "God is power." And he
continues:
You know the Party slogan: 'Freedom Is Slavery.' Has it ever
occurred to you that it is reversible? Slavery is freedom. Alone -
free - the human being is always defeated. It must be so,
because every human being is doomed to die, which is the
greatest of all failures. But if he can make complete, utter
submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can merge
himself in the Party so that he is the Party, then he is all-powerful
and immortal.
Of course, all this is satirically meant. Freedom is slavery,
indeed! The idea, we exclaim, is preposterous, mere playing around
with words. That is true, but it is true also that such submission is
demanded and readily given, not only in totalitarian regimes like
Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, but also by some religious
movements, and by countries like Victorian Britain where the
nation's needs were placed always above those of the individual.
Slavery can never be freedom, we say; but there are in many
countries today people who are slaves in the sense that they have
given up the desire for individual thought, and are happy in such
abnegation. There are psychiatrists who treat political dissidents as
people suffering from mental illness and "cure" those who have no
disease, scientists who willingly play a part in preparing weapons
that can destroy millions of people (or in the case of the neutron
bomb kill people while preserving buildings and equipment for the
conquerors), and these people do not think of themselves as doing
anything wrong. Nor do they think that they are slaves. They are
simply acting in accordance with the will of a particular state, and
many of them would say that the work they are doing, even when it
involves destruction and torture, is in the interests of freedom.
So freedom needs defining, it cannot simply be invoked. And
freedom is not the only word to be treated as an abstraction of
absolute good. In his essay on "Politics and the English
Language", written in 1947, Orwell noted this. He said:
The word 'Fascism' has now no meaning except in so far as it
signifies 'something not desirable'. The words democracy,
socialism, freedom, patriotic, realistic, justice, have each of
them several different meanings which cannot be reconciled with
one another. In the case of a word like democracy, not only is
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there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is resisted
from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a
country democratic we are praising it: consequently the defenders
of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that
they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to one
meaning.
The process he observed, with remarkable prescience just after
the war, has developed greatly during the past thirty-odd years. In
Britain today to call somebody a Fascist is simply a term of abuse,
to say that an organisation uses fascist methods probably means
only that they have refused a union request for increased wages.
Opponents of Mrs. Thatcher often call her a Fascist, Tories say the
same about some Labour and trade union leaders, and label any
intellectual they dislike as a bleeding heart or a pinko. I have seen
Mr. Trudeau called a Fascist in print, and I don't doubt that the
same word is applied to his opponents. The word's use extends from
politics to culture, and indeed to almost everything. Any limit
placed on what may be said in a book, play or film, any job denied
to a member of a minority group - denied, say, to a black or
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to mean anything a speaker wishes can lead to absurdities - cases
where something proclaimed as an extension of freedom in one year
may soon afterwards be called fascism. One ludicrous instance
relates to Lady Chatterley's Lover. In the famous Old Bailey trial of
November, 1960, the book, which had hitherto been unpublished in
Britain except in expurgated form, was found not to be obscene.
Defence witnesses including clergymen, literary critics, the Tory
MP Norman St. John Stevas, who was later to be leader of the
House of Commons, said some things about the book that may
make them blush a little today. They said it had great educational
merit for the young, that every Catholic and Catholic priest would
benefit by reading it, that it contained a moving advocacy of
chastity, that it was a moral tract. There was universal rejoicing
among progressives that the book could now be freely read, and in
fact the paperback sales were well over a million copies. But at that
time the feminist movement was in its infancy, and writers like
Andrea Dworkin, Susan Griffin and Susan Brownmiller hadn't yet
published their books maintaining (I'm quoting from Brownmiller's
Against Our Will) that rape is the action by which men keep women
in order, and - this is Dworkin - that women will be free only
when pornography no longer exists. So what about Lady
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Chatterley? For the most active and vocal feminists today it is a
disgusting work, inspired by male chauvinism, and (whisper the
word) fascist. I quote from a letter of December 1981 in England's
most progressive paper, The Guardian:
Twenty odd years ago the degree of sexual ignorance in this
country was so appalling that it was an easy matter for the
academic establishment to promote a sexually repressive fascist
novelette such as Lady Chatterley's Lover as a beacon of
enlightenment. Are we still prepared to accept this cheating
obscenity?
The feminist movement sees nothing incongruous in asking for
the greatest possible freedom for themselves, and at the same time
demanding the banning of all pornography, including the "fascist
novelette", Lady Chatterley's Lover. Do you approve of freedom
for militant feminism or freedom for Lady Chatterley? You can't do
both.
The contradictions between speech and action are equally great if
we consider the word "democracy". As Orwell says, every
political group and party calls itself democratic, but sometimes this
democracy is expressed in strange ways. In the recent election for
leader of the Labour Party a major part was played by the trade
unions, which had been allotted 40 per cent of the total vote. How
did they decide which way those votes would be cast? In many
cases, not by consultation with the mass of members but by decision
of an executive committee, some thirty or forty people who said
which way half a million or more votes should cast. The union
leaders said, with straight faces, that this was a democratic
procedure. In the British Liberal Party, which also claims to be
democratic, the Party leader has an overriding veto over anything
that may be decided by the members at the yearly Party Conference.
Perhaps they have all been reading Lewis Carroll: "When I use a
word it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less."
Or perhaps we should give up using the word democracy.
There will always be some who ask whether any of this matters
much. The English language, they say, is in a process of continual
change, and if the use of words is altered, no doubt this is a
reflection of their different meaning for a changing society. But this
is mere sophistical chat, used most often to cover with a sanctified
word something the sophist dislikes. To call Lawrence's novel a
fascist novelette is simply abuse without factual reference. To call
the Labour and Liberal actions I have described democratic is a
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reversal of the word's dictionary meaning. And of course these are
only two examples out of hundreds where the accepted meaning of
words or phrases is ignored or inverted by those who want to cover
their actual intentions. We must look always for the reality behind
the phrase. Two current misuses of the word democracy occur in the
American claim that they are acting to support democracy in Central
American, and the British Government's similar claim about their
policy in Northern Ireland. In fact the Americans wish to impose
local dictatorships congenial to themselves, and the British rule
Northern Ireland through the Army. It may be that American-
imposed dictorship and British military rule are the best available
possibilities for the people of those countries, but there is nothing
democratic about actions which are dictated solely by national
self-interest.
But this is really a long parenthesis, a demonstration of ways in
which use of the word freedom is meaningless or contradictory. I
return to the question of how, coming up to 1984, we can talk about
freedom in a way that has meaning. I suggest that instead of using
the word as an abstraction we should consider always instead
particular, specific freedoms, and that all of those freedoms must
have limits. Freedom, in fact, is relative, not absolute.
As an illustration of this, let me outline the course of an actual
argument between Orwell and myself soon after the end of World
War II. (In case anybody should think I am misrepresenting Orwell,
perhaps I should say that the article was published in 1946, and that
he read and commented on it.) It concerned the question of free
speech for Fascists I am using the word correctly, to mean those
who were members of the British Union of Fascists or supported
Hitler or Mussolini. If you had power to suppress Fascist
propaganda, I asked Orwell, would you do so? He replied:
"Not to-day. The Fascists are a negligible force in England now,
and suppression is always a bad thing. First Fascists are
suppressed, then Trotskyists, Stalinists, finally anybody who is
opposed to the Government. "
And yet, I said, he had been in favour of suppressing Fascist
propaganda during the war?
"Yes, because then they were working for the Germans -just as
pacifists were, though most of the pacifists didn't intend to do
s o . "
But wasn't that wholly illogical? He said:
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"Very well, then, it's illogical. But two things are plain to
anyone with common sense. First, suppression of political
freedom is a bad thing. But second, when you're fighting for
your life against Fascism, you'd be a plain fool to allow a Fascist
Fifth Column to flourish in your country."
He was certainly inconsistent, and I thought then that Orwell was
wrong but I believe now that his general argument was right. I said I
would return to that remark of his about freedom of the press
meaning the freedom to criticise and oppose. To suppress Fascist
propaganda in wartime was a contradiction of that statement, yet
Orwell was obviously sensible to say that a society which permits
enemy propaganda to circulate in wartime must desire its own
destruction. Is there a parallel here with Mill's refusal to let those
who thought corn dealers starved the poor to say so outside the
house of a corn dealer? No, because perhaps the corn dealer did
starve the local poor, whereas the enemy in wartime was intent on
destroying every freedom valued by the British and other peoples in
Europe. In such circumstances, Orwell was saying, freedom must
have limits.
Perhaps I should add, as a pendant to this argument, and to show
the complexity of it, that Orwell and I were both members at this
time of a body called the Freedom Defence Committee. During the
war quite a lot of Fascists had been imprisoned without trial, and
when the war ended some of them remained in prison, along with a
few pacifists and other dissidents. The National Council for Civil
Liberties had become at that time a Communist front organisation,
and showed no interest except in Communist prisoners. The
Freedom Defence Committee took up cases of people whose
opinions we might detest, but who were being kept in prison for no
reason. Freedom, in this case, demanded that we should campaign
for the release of those who had no interest in freedom. Orwell took
an active interest in the Committee, and drafted a manifesto for a
larger grouping that never developed. It's relevant to what I've been
saying that he thought the first task of the group should be to
redefine the word "democracy", which he said had to go beyond
what it meant to nineteenth century liberals.
So, freedom is relative. But, more than that, freedom depends on
law. It is significant in 1984 that Oceania is a country where
"nothing was illegal, since there were no longer any laws". Were
the inhabitants free, then? Not at all. Keeping a diary was
punishable by death, or a long term in a forced labour camp. No
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doubt Orwell had particularly in mind here the Soviet Union, which
had a model constitution guaranteeing all sorts of so-called rights,
rights which didn't prevent millions of people being imprisoned
without trial. And today they are still imprisoned, or sent to labour
camps or psychiatric hospitals - or they simply disappear. There
are many countries now in which a discussion like this one would be
impossible, and where any use of the word freedom must be
ironical. They include, obviously, the Soviet Union and its
satellites, but also many dictatorships in Africa and South America
with quite different political approaches. But those imprisoned
because they have put on paper ideas about possible changes in their
society (putting things on paper is the cardinal sin, all dictatorships
fear the written word) are not inclined to make nice distinctions
between one kind of dictatorship and another. They would be likely
to greet with bitter laughs the situation of those lucky enough to
have the luxury of arguing about whether freedom is absolute or
relative. Their own deprivation of many freedoms, they might say,
has certainly been absolute.
One can only express sympathy and sorrow, while asserting that
the distinctions do matter. It is widely known that almost all the
dissidents who have escaped from or been expelled by totalitarian
regimes have been dismayed, and often disgusted, by what seems to
them the triviality and the consumer-oriented greed of Western
countries. Our desire for more automobiles in every family, better
TV sets and videos, a wider range of convenience foods, seems to
them trivial. But the nature of freedom is not trivial. It is among the
matters that the Czechoslovak adherents to Charter 77 and the
writers of Russian samizdat would be arguing about if they were
allowed to do so.
Orwell was not concerned only, either in 1984 or in his essays,
with the Soviet Union. He took up the point I have made about the
interdependence of freedom and law in an essay called "Politics
versus Literature", stressing a totalitarian tendency which he found
in the anarchist and pacifist visions of society. "In a society in
which there is no law and in theory no compulsion", he wrote, "the
only arbiter of behaviour is public opinion. But public opinion,
because of the tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious
animals, is less tolerant than any system of law."
This was certainly true at the time he was writing, but it is no
longer so today. Orwell lived in a period when there was a
consensus of feeling about what might be said within the bounds of
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decorum, good taste, or even the law. Mill, nearly a hundred years
earlier, was of course even more firmly bound by conventions of
speech and behaviour. But there is now no such consensus, and all
sorts of freedoms exist that Orwell did not even imagine as
possibilities. Some concern the freedom to write and to publish. In
several countries it is now possible to publish anything of a sexual
or what would in the past have been called blasphemous nature
without fear of prosecution. In Britain the Lady Chatterley trial
played a large part in securing this freedom. In the United States a
cat's cradle of complications involving the possibility that a
publication otherwise obscene might still be for the public good, has
been solved by almost total permissiveness. In some other European
countries there has been for a long while a tradition of almost
completely free speech.
Let me return for a moment to the Lady Chatterley decision, and
its results. I was present throughout the trial, reporting it for the
London Sunday Times as a matter of literary and social importance,
and along with the other reporters I had no doubt that the book
would be found obscene, especially after a summing-up wholly
against it by Mr. Justice Byrne. The nine men and three women who
made up the jury were in appearance wholly ordinary, yet their
verdict contradicted Orwell's idea that public opinion is less tolerant
than any system of law when they voted unanimously for acquittal.
The surprised commentators said hurrah at the verdict, and the
freedom it gave to writers.
I don't think any of us envisaged this particular freedom as one
that would bring true a minor aspect of Orwell's book, that of
Pornosec. This, in case you don't recall it, is the production of
cheap pornography for the lowest section of the population.
Pornosec is not produced by individuals. (In 1984 almost no
activities are individual.) It is produced by a group working to
instructions, on novel-writing machines which issue "booklets in
sealed packets with titles like Spanking Stories or One Night in a
Girl's School." At the time Orwell wrote, this sort of group book
production, whether pornographic or not, was a fantasy. Now the
novel-writing machine, in the form of a book produced by several
hands, is very much a reality. The blockbuster, or best-seller, is
often conceived in the mind of a literary agent who thinks of an idea
which seems to promise immense sales. The agent approaches a
publisher, agrees on an enormous advance - and then, and often
not till then, a writer is called in to produce the book, with the
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critical help of publisher and agent. As for Pornosec it is very much
with us, not as a propaganda function of government but as big
business. Big criminal business too, linked to the Mafia.
This extension of literary freedom has posed social rather than
sexual questions. Social questions are also posed by the treatment of
homosexuals in Western society. Few people nowadays would think
it right that Oscar Wilde should have been sent to prison. Probably a
large majority would agree that it is humane and right that
consenting adults should do whatever they wish together in private,
something that in Britain happened as a result of legislation enacted
on the basis of a report made by Sir John Wolfenden. If we look
back at Mill, we find him saying that society has no right to interfere
in "that portion of person's life and conduct which affects only
himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary,
and undeceived consent and participation." But male homosexuals
and lesbians now demand much more than the mere consent of the
majority. Like feminists, they have gone on the attack. The
newspaper extract I am going to read is not exceptional, but typical
of many others. It concerns a plan by a London borough council to
allow homosexuals to look after children in the council nurseries
and children's homes. The Council spokesman said:
It is important for the personal development of children and
young people that they are aware of different sexualities and the
possible choices available to them. The council will therefore
recruit lesbians and gay men to all council posts.
The statement produced hostile reactions from many families, for
reasons that I need hardly describe. Nevertheless, it is now in
practice. There is among homosexuals and feminists, as in all
minority groups, a strong impulse to proselytise. Often this is
harmless or trivial. Nobody will feel particular concern if
proponents of vegetarianism, opponents of vivisection or members
of religious groups like Jehovah's Witnesses campaign strongly for
their cause, because they do not interfere with the desire of the
majority to eat meat, use the scientific knowledge obtained by
experiments on animals, and pursue their own attitudes towards
religion. The case is obviously different where lesbians and
homosexuals are looking after those of an impressionalbe age,
children whom they will attempt to guide into a way of life that
seems good to them, but is not one that the majority of parents
would wish for their children.
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I have been speaking about this with almost unseemly
moderation, but you may have gathered that I am now approaching
directly the question: are some freedoms undesirable? I believe that
this is so. I think we should never talk about "freedom", but should
consider instead each individual freedom as it affects society. As an
example, the idea of trade unionism, that groups of people should
be free to join together to obtain improvements in the conditions of
their work that they could never achieve alone, and thus realise
greater freedom throughout their lives, is clearly a good one in any
industrial society. The practical operations of trade unions, on the
other hand, are open to various objections, all of which could be
comprised in their tendency like other minority movements (for
individual trade unions, large though they may be, are always a
small minority) to limit freedom for the majority in the course of
improving their own position in society. I don't want to consider
here the nuts and bolts of trade union practice, like the closed shop,
the compulsory contributions to this and that, the withdrawal of a
union card as a punishment. Some of these may be justified in
particular times and places, others not. The same arguments cannot
be applied to well paid printing workers and semi-starving Mexican
grape-pickers, even though both are striking for higher wages. The
point is that trade unions arose as a curb on the unjust authority of
employers, and that a similar curb is necessary to-day on many of
the unions themselves. If one accepts that both freedom and order
are necessary elements in society, then the kind of freedom trade
unions demand and the kind of order they impose are sometimes
unacceptable. On the other hand, if anybody doubts the need for
unions to exist independent of government control, the example of
the Soviet bloc countries, where they are merely agents for carrying
out government instructions, should be a sufficient warning. Free
trade unions are essential: complete freedom for trade unions is not.
When we try to assess personal, as distinct from group,
freedoms, we come back to that basic question of the balance to be
maintained between society and the individual. Mill thought that in
his time, as he put it: "Society has fairly got the better of
individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not
the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and
preferences." In 1984 Orwell went further, and depicted a world in
which individuality has been extinguished. One of the purposes of
Newspeak, the language of Oceania, is to make heretical ideas
literally unspeakable, because there is no language in which they
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can be expressed. During the course of Winston's re-education by
O'Brien, when Winston asks whether something exists as you or I
exist, O'Brien says calmly: "You do not exist." And this gives
further point to the slogan "Freedom in Slavery." Only through
slavery can the individual escape from the troubles that exist
through personal passions, beliefs and doubts. Slavery removes
them all.
The picture is a true one for totalitarian society. On the dark side
of the world, the side ruled by dictatorships of all kinds, society has
got the better of individuality, although the struggles of dissidents
proclaiming heretical views tell us that individuality survives. Even
in the Soviet Union the nightmare of 1984 has not yet been realised.
On what we think of as the light side, however, almost the contrary
is true: individuality has triumphed, and in the name of freedom has
in the past twenty years punched many holes in the fabric of society.
With these personal freedoms has gone an inability to understand on
the part of those who demand them, even a refusal to contemplate,
what life is like on the dark side. Yes, yes, we say, things are
terrible for those in the prison camps, dungeons, torture chambers
of those countries: but we are far more truly outraged when
somebody in our own country is unjustly imprisoned for a month, or
loses his job because of his colour or religion, or is beaten up
because he is a member of some minority.
Yet those who complain of such minor injustices are quite likely
to be the same people as those who say of dissidents elsewhere that
they knew what would happen if they opposed their government. A
sense of proportion is too often lacking. In his Nobel Prize speech
Solzhenitsyn underlined the vast difference in approach:
What, according to one scale, appears from afar as enviable
flourishing freedom, according to another scale, near at hand, is
perceived as vexatious constraint calling for the overturning of
buses. What, in one area, could only be dreamed of as
unattainable prosperity, in another area gives rise to indignation
and is considered vicious exploitation demanding an immediate
strike. . .There are different scales for punishment and for crime.
According to one scale, a month's imprisonment, or banishment
to the country, or to a so-called 'punishment cell' where they feed
you with white bread rolls and milk, shocks the imagination and
fills the columns of the newspapers with anger. According to
another scale, people accept as reasonable prison terms of
twenty-five years, dungeons where there is ice on the wall but
where they strip you to your underwear, lunatic asylums for the
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sane, and the shooting on the frontier of countless people who
won't see reason and who keep running away.
Sometimes there is more than the indifference Solzhenitsyn
talked of. One of the worst features of our time is an active hatred
felt against those most helpless - the poor, the old, the
handicapped, children - so that they are often the targets of
vicious, meaningless attacks on the part of those who are
themselves deprived. This hardness of heart, this desire to eliminate
the dangerous emotion of pity, is again remarkably prefigured in
Orwell's book. Winston, in his diary, writes things he is quickly
ashamed of:
Last night to the flicks. All war films. One very good one of a
ship full of refugees being bombed somewhere in the
Mediterranean. Audience much amused by shots of great huge fat
man trying to swim away with a helicopter after him, first you
saw him wallowing along in the water like a porpoise, then you
saw him through the helicopter's gunsights, then he was full of
holes and the sea around him turned pink and he sank as suddenly
as though the holes had let in the water, audience shouting with
laughter when he sank.
Freedom of the pen, freedom of speech and action, are blessings,
of course they are. Yet on our side of the world they have been used
in recent years to promote a kind of nihilism that denies the need for
any social order. In essence all of the "freedoms" such nihilism
demands deny the importance of the intellect and the relevance of
reason. Among them one that may seem very minor is particularly
damaging because it affects the future: the demand for freedom
from any set kind of academic instruction.
At its mildest this particular freedom can, in some universities,
make it possible for a student to take an English degree without
having read a word of Shakespeare. With the rejection in such
places of a core curriculum - of certain works or groups of works
that must be read by anybody taking an English degree - a student
may take courses in a number of subjects which will give him a
degree, even though he remains ignorant of all the major English
poets and most of the major novelists. This is surely a freedom that
is of no use to anybody. A small matter, you may think, although it
indicates at the least a slackening of standards: but certainly it is
small in comparison with the demand of students a few years ago
that they, rather than the President and faculty, should control what
is done in a University. Were they objecting to inadequate teaching,
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or to a dictatorial rule? Not at all. Most of them, and the sizeable
minority of academics who supported them, disliked rather what
they saw as the feebleness of liberalism, expressed in adminis-
trators' reluctance to fight them with anything but the proper
weapons in the customary way. The kind of freedom students asked
for in the late Sixties and early Seventies was freedom to destroy the
structure of the very institution in which they were being educated.
Told to report to their deans for discipline they demanded instead in
one case that the vice-President should appear before them. The
case, as I'm sure some of you will recall, was that of Columbia
University in New York, and the protesting students denied the right
of the University's governors to govern. Under the slogan of
participatory democracy (that word democracy, what weight it
bears) these students demanded the right to take part in managing
the University, the right to set their own courses. Their chief
spokesman said, in a letter to the President: "We will destroy your
world, your corporation, your University."
In her bright essay on the troubles at Columbia, Diana Trilling
said truly that the students' "disaffection from the University
represented the disaffection from modern society and its authorities
of people everywhere to-day." It is true that the revolt at Columbia
and the similar disruptions and acts against authority at many other
Universities and colleges in the Western world, have not been
repeated in the past few years, but the kind of nihilistic freedom
demanded then has simply spread and been diversified, one
powerful stream going into what is vaguely called the women's
movement, another into racial struggle. In relation to the question of
universities and revolt against them as institutions, Saul Bellow
spoke what seems to me a final word. "You don't found
universities in order to destroy culture", he said. "For that you
want a Nazi party." Some of the Columbia students were taking on
the role of the Nazi party. And there is a question vitally important
to this whole argument about the nature and limits of freedom which
Bellow says is a basic subject of his books. It is: "How can one
resist the controls of this vast society without turning into a nihilist,
avoiding the absurdity of empty rebellion?" His protagonists do not
find complete or satisfactory answers, any more than the rest of us
have done, but like him they understand the importance of the
question.
Let me try to draw together the threads of what I have been
saying. I have suggested that the word "freedom" should never be
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used as a mere desirable abstraction. It should be considered always
in the context of something specific. We should say: freedom to do
this for one group means some restrictions on another group who
wish to do that. Then we should ask: is group A's freedom worth
group B's restriction? I have suggested also that, in the unending
struggle between the rights of individuals and the needs of society
the balance has in the West tipped too far in favour of individuals
when they join together in minority pressure groups. I hope, without
much confidence, that nobody will interpret this as a view that such
pressure groups should not exist. But as propagandists demanding
freedom for themselves they should always be aware of their
minority position in society, and the fact that they cannot be granted
too much freedom without changing and damaging the nature of that
society. That fine phrase of W.B. Yeats: "In dreams begin
responsibilities" might in this context be adapted to read: "In
freedom begins responsibility". It is such responsibility that
Solzhenitsyn had in mind when he asked in his Nobel Prize speech:
"Who will explain to mankind what is really terrible and
unbearable, and what only irritates our skin because it is near?" It is
a fine freedom for the writer to be able to use any words and
describe any actions without fear of prosecution: but that freedom
carries with it a burden of responsibility which many writers have
ignored, instead scratching away at the mere irritation of the skin.
Over much that I have been saying I feel the shadow of Orwell,
not merely that of the author of 1984 (although many of the ideas
advanced here are implicit in the argument about the nature and
possibility of freedom conducted in that book), but also of the
essayist whose commonsense cut away the verbiage from many of
the theories of his own time to show the nonsense beneath. One of
the things that Orwell knew, and looked at often in his writings, is
that individual freedom must be controlled by reasonable law. In
Oceania there were no laws, and so in theory no limitation on what
might be done. But, as in any society where there is no apparent
limit to freedom, there was in Oceania no freedom.
